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Myers: I would say, despite their age, these are very, very dangerous people. . . So they may be 
juveniles, but they're not on a little-league team anywhere, they're on a major league team, and 
it's a terrorist team. . .  
Rumsfeld: This constant refrain of ‘the juveniles,’ as though there’s a hundred children in there 
— these are not children. Dick Myers responded to that.1 
 
*** 
As this discussion establishes, ‘[o]ur history is replete with laws and judicial recognition’ that 
children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults.2 
 
*** 
 
One of my motivations in seeking a reasonable resolution of the case is that, as a juvenile at the 
time of his capture, Jawad should have been segregated from the adult detainees, and some 
serious attempt made to rehabilitate him. I am bothered by the fact that this was not done. I am a 
resolute Catholic and take as an article of faith that justice is defined as reparative and 
restorative, and that Christ's most radical pronouncement - command, if you will - is to love 
one's enemies.3  
 
<> 
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1
 General Richard Myers, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Defense 
Department press conference of April 25, 2003, responding to press inquiries on new public information that 
juveniles were detained at Guantanamo. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and 
Gen. Myers, April 25, 2003, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2510, visited on 
December 26, 2011.  
2
 From the majority opinion of Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2404 
(2011), quoting from Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-116 (1982), and holding that “so long as the child's 
age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a 
reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.” Id. at 
2406. If in custody for alleged criminal conduct, the child must be given Miranda warnings.  
3
 From the Declaration of Lt. Col. Darrell J. Vandeveld on the occasion of his resignation as chief prosecutor in 
another juvenile prosecution at Guantanamo,  Jawad v. United States (Military Commission) (Sept. 22, 2008), 
available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/docs/vandeveld_declaration_080922.pdf, visited on Dec. 8, 
2011.  
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Introduction 
 
Omar Khadr, age 15 and a citizen of Canada, was given emergency medical care for 
near-fatal gun-shot wounds and taken into custody by U.S. forces in Afghanistan on July 27, 
2002. U.S. military forces had been in that country since October of 2001, only a month after the 
devastating attacks on the United States of September 11. Omar Khadr was, without doubt, a 
child on the date of his detention and all prior dates of his alleged criminal conduct. He was, 
however, caught up on that July day in a prolonged military encounter with deaths on both sides 
including, very nearly, his own. Some would thus first characterize him not as a child but as a 
combatant – “child soldier” is the term most often applied in such situations, but the more neutral 
“child in armed conflict” is generally used here.4  
Omar, badly wounded with two near-fatal gunshots to the back, was held and 
interrogated immediately and aggressively at Bagram Air Force Base near Kabul for several 
months before his transfer to Guantanamo Bay after he had turned 16.5 Omar spent two years at 
Guantanamo undergoing regular, routine and sometimes brutal interrogation without 
representation by counsel, and four years in all before he was charged by a military commission 
with war crimes.6 He was ultimately classified by the United States government as an “alien 
unprivileged enemy belligerent,” susceptible to charges by military commission for his unlawful 
                                                 
4
 Professor Marc Drumbl suggests in a forthcoming book that the terminology in the field has moved toward 
“children associated with armed forces or armed groups,” acknowledging its “somewhat tongue-tying” nature. I will 
use the term suggested in the text. Marc A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, 
Washington & Lee Public Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Accepted Paper No. 2011-17, September 2, 2011, 
on SSRN at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1921527, visited on November 18, 2011.  
5
 The best and most accurate portrayal of the interrogation regime at Bagram during that period of time is in the 
documentary film, “Taxi to the Dark Side,” a chilling examination of torture and death at Bagram. Omar Khadr’s 
were among those interviewed on-screen.  
6
 Because we all have become inured with, or perhaps numbed by, the issue of prolonged detention at Guantanamo 
without trial, we have lost our shock at the unlawfulness of untimely trial itself. We must note that most U.S. 
jurisdictions require trial within 90 to 180 days of detention of the accused, at risk that all charges can be dismissed 
for failure to honor the constitutional obligation of speedy trial. See Richard J. Wilson, Guantanamo: It’s About 
Time, Bangor Daily News, March 25, 2009.  
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acts in combat. It was the view of commission prosecutors that his belligerent status denied him 
the protections of both human rights and humanitarian law, for reasons that will be developed 
below. This essay explores the intersections and tensions between international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law as those two doctrinal areas played out in the concrete 
situation of Omar Khadr, with particular focus on how issues regarding his youth were addressed 
by the many tribunals involved. The issues on Omar’s youth ran through many contexts, raising 
judicial questions regarding the legality of his detention, his treatment and separation from adults 
while detained, jurisdiction over him for prosecution for war crimes, and the inadmissibility of 
statements based on his youth.  
I served as pro bono counsel for Omar Khadr between October of 2004 and the spring of 
2007, when we ceased representation at his request.7 During that time, I visited with him in the 
detention facilities at Guantanamo on about a dozen occasions and appeared as his lawyer in 
habeas corpus proceedings to challenge his detention in the federal courts of Washington, D.C. I 
also served as his civilian counsel in the first military commission hearings held at Guantanamo, 
prior to the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which struck down the 
commissions as then composed.8 In addition, as part of our work in the International Human 
Rights Law Clinic at American University, I appeared with students in federal court and at the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, first on behalf all detainees at Guantanamo, and 
later seeking precautionary measures from the United States government on behalf of Omar 
                                                 
7
 From the outset, I worked closely with co-counsel, Prof. Muneer Ahmad, a colleague on the faculty at American 
University’s Washington College of Law. Most of our visits with Omar were together, but sometimes he or I went to 
the base alone, and later I was joined by another faculty member, Prof. Kristine Huskey, on one occasion. Students 
in the International Human Rights Law Clinic assisted in all aspects of representation discussed in this article, to the 
extent that their clearance status permitted. With the exception of one semester, no student was given a security 
clearance to have access to classified documents, including client statements, unless they were cleared for public 
viewing by a review panel set up for that purpose. Virtually all documents relating to his case were classified.   
8
 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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Khadr, based largely on his age at the time of his capture. I can safely say, as a personal matter, 
that this was the single most demanding, and most interesting, case of my legal career.   
Because he was Canadian, Omar had Canadian lawyers who raised legal challenges in the 
domestic courts there, to the extent that those courts were able to intervene in the U.S. legal 
process. Those lawyers drew on arguments regarding Omar’s youth at the time of the events that 
resulted in his detention, and they were remarkably successful in obtaining favorable decisions 
on Omar’s behalf. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan, the Republican-dominated 
U.S. Congress quickly reconstituted the military commissions through new legislation and Omar 
was again charged with the crimes to which he eventually pled guilty. New military lawyers 
were appointed to represent Omar, and his Canadian lawyers took on the role of “legal advisors” 
to him at Guantanamo. After our work on Omar’s behalf ended in the spring of 2007, his 
appointed military defense lawyers continued to raise issues regarding his youth and status in 
both habeas corpus and military commission contexts. It is the combined advocacy on behalf of 
Omar Khadr in a rich array of tribunals – US and Canadian federal courts, military commissions, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the United Nations – from which this 
essay emerges.  
I will first examine, in part I, the broad context of the Khadr case. That context includes 
the Khadr family background, the relevant law relating to children in armed conflict, the overall 
situation of juvenile detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, and a bit of history on the 
prosecution of children in armed conflict. In part II, I will document the efforts to put the issue of 
Omar’s youth before the Washington federal court in habeas corpus proceedings, including some 
effort to develop the facts relating to Omar’s capture and subsequent detention in Afghanistan 
and Guantanamo. In part III, I will examine the ways in which the question of juvenile status 
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affected military commission proceedings, both before and after the Hamdan decision. In part 
IV, the role of the Canadian courts in this complex array of litigation will be explored through 
the lens of Omar’s age. I will examine the ways in which the issue of Omar’s youth was 
addressed in proceedings before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Part V, 
and Part VI will discuss the outcome of the Khadr case. It will also offer my own conclusions 
and reflections on the ways in which the international law of armed conflict and human rights 
interacted in these proceedings. 
I. Context: The Khadr family, the law, juveniles detained at Guantanamo Bay   
and elsewhere, and juveniles in war crimes trials in history 
 
It is difficult to decide what constitutes the full factual context of the “Khadr case.” A full 
recitation of Omar Khadr’s factual narrative is either forbidden or contested. It is forbidden 
because of the draconian limitations placed on all Guantanamo defense lawyers regarding 
disclosure of factual information obtained from their clients, or regarding their cases in general. 
Virtually all information is treated either as “classified” or “protected,” with such protections 
justified on national security grounds.9 It is contested because so much about Guantanamo and 
its detainees has yet to become public through careful investigation and historical clarification. If 
the crucible of a trial is the vehicle for arriving at the truth of the status of the Guantanamo 
detainees themselves, one must recall that of the 779 total detainees ever held there, only five 
have been convicted of any crime: four, including Omar, in military commission proceedings, 
and one by transfer to the United States for trial. The military commissions, even in their post-
Hamdan iteration, are subject to strong and justified criticism for their lack of fundamental 
                                                 
9
 The best summary of these limitations, in my view, is offered in David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in 
Guantanamo, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1981 (2008). The most recent absurdity in these limitations is the effort by 
government lawyers to prevent the Guantanamo defense lawyers from using or disseminating, in any way, the 
materials regarding Guantanamo detainees posted on Wikileaks, which can be read and freely disseminated by 
anyone else in the world.  
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fairness and transparency. The remaining cases, all in habeas corpus proceedings, continue a 
slow slog through the courts.  
According to counts by lawyers involved in detainee representation, there are still 171 
men at Guantanamo. Thirty-six men in all have been referred for prosecution by military 
commission, with one, Ahmed Ghailani, transferred to the U.S. for prosecution, where he was 
convicted in federal court proceedings.10 Of the cases in court on habeas corpus, there have been 
63 decisions on the merits, with 38 grants and 25 denials. Of those cases, there have been 21 
active appeals submitted for decision, with 16 decisions, and 5 petitions for certiorari pending as 
of December 2011.11   
A. The Khadr Family 
One struggles here with the question of whether to view the events surrounding the Khadr 
case through the narrow, close-up lens of the single armed confrontation in Afghanistan that led 
to his prosecution by military commission; through the context of his prolonged detention, 
relentless interrogation and mistreatment by his captors at Bagram Air Force Base and later at 
Guantanamo; through the broader lens of Omar’s own life and that of his family; or through the 
sweeping history of radical Islam, which both precedes and follows the attacks against the 
United States on September 11, 2001.12 I will start with the Khadr family, and provide greater 
information about Omar’s own conduct in the conclusion to this article. 
                                                 
10
 Email to Guantanamo listserv from David Remes, Dec. 19, 2011, on file with the author. Ghailani, was prosecuted 
for his role in the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and was sentenced to life imprisonment in 
January of 2011. Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Detainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts, N.Y. Times, January 25, 
2011.  
11
 Email to Guantanamo listserv from Brian Foster, Dec. 6, 2011, on file with the author.  
12
 For a discussion of the issue of the instability of the concept of time-framing in the criminal law, see Mark 
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 593 (1981). One scholar, 
a philosopher teaching law, ponders whether a rationally consistent act requirement can be justified at all in the 
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The Khadr family was famous – or infamous – in Canada well before Omar’s arrest. His 
father, Ahmed, had been arrested in 1995, for his alleged role in the bombing of the Egyptian 
embassy in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad. The Canadian government had intervened in order to 
obtain his return to Canada, and all charges were eventually dropped. No charge was ever filed 
against Ahmed Khadr alleging criminal links to Al Qaeda, but all of Canada associated the 
Khadr family with Ahmed’s designation as “al Kanadi,” the Canadian jihadists.13 The Khadr 
family was, in short, notorious in their hometown of Scarborough, a suburb of Toronto, and 
throughout the country.  
Ahmed Khadr died in an armed confrontation in Pakistan on October 3, 2003, a year after 
Omar arrived at Guantanamo. His youngest brother, Kareem, who was with his father at the time 
of his capture, would survive but return to Canada in a wheelchair with a severed spine.14 Omar’s 
next oldest brother, Abdurahman, spent some time with him at Guantanamo and was said to have 
worked as an informant for the CIA,15 while Abdullah, the oldest Khadr sibling, was sought by 
the United States for his alleged terrorist activities. Abdullah was returned to Canada from 
Pakistan, where he had been held in custody and interrogated using methods that subsequently 
caused the Canadian courts to famously deny a request for his extradition to the United States.16 
Abdullah was subsequently freed. Omar’s eldest sister, Zaynab, appears in Lawrence Wright’s 
Pulitzer Prize-winning book, The Looming Tower, as a friend and confidant of the family of 
                                                                                                                                                             
criminal law. Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2437 (2007) (“[W]e should not 
be confident about whether criminal law contains an act requirement . . .” Id., at 2459). 
13
 Perhaps the most inflammatory of the books accusing the Khadr family of links to terrorism is Stuart Bell’s COLD 
TERROR: HOW CANADA NURTURES AND EXPORTS TERRORISM AROUND THE WORLD (2004). Chapter 6 of that 
fustian rant is titled “The Al Kanadi Family Jihad.” Id. at 156. Omar is described there as a “very sweet, simple and 
easygoing person, . . . loved by his family and friends. . . He is known to be trustworthy. He mainly sticks with . . . 
mom and dad. . . He can’t kill a fly.” With that fragment of his character, it is then said that “he would also fall into 
the grip of Al Qaeda.” Id. at 169.  
14
 MICHELLE SHEPHARD, GUANTANAMO’S CHILD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF OMAR KHADR 85 (2008). 
15
 Id. at 141-144. 
16
 The appeal affirming the denial of extradition can be found at United States of America v. Khadr, 2011 O.N.C.A. 
358 (2011) (Can.).  
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Osama bin Laden.17 In short, the Khadr family legacy weighs heavily on Omar. It 
unquestionably played a role in Canada’s decision, alone among U.S. allies, not to seek 
repatriation to his home country from detention in Cuba.  
A. The Law: “Soldiers” in Redefined Paradigms 
The law at Guantanamo, and more broadly in the “war on terror,” is opaque, much like 
the facts. The United States government’s legal branches and agencies suffered from a special 
kind of hubris, brought on by its vengeful response to the attacks of 9/11. Its approach to 
international law after 9/11 developed because of many factors, including ignorance, sometimes 
willful or politically expedient; the right hand not knowing what the left was doing; and the most 
importantly, redefinition of concepts and whole doctrines to serve the purposes of homeland 
security, and to justify harsh and aggressive conduct in retaliation for the attacks. The 
government, in short, gave new meaning to international law as “soft law” through their efforts 
to manipulate it to serve political ends.18  
The most fundamental redefinitions, for example, are relevant to the legal terrain under 
study here, and deserve explication before beginning a more detailed study of the law applicable 
to children in war. They relate to the law to be applied relating to territorial jurisdiction and the 
issue of the principle of distinction of civilian from soldier in humanitarian law. One of the first 
legal actions taken on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees was a petition filed by certain NGOs 
and individuals, including the author, to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(“Commission” or “Inter-American Commission”). The Inter-American Commission is an 
                                                 
17
 LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11, 284-290 (2006). 
18
 That many of those positions have not changed a decade after 9/11, when calmer and more careful approaches 
should have replaced them, should deeply disturb not just scholars of the field but all who may fall within the scope 
of the U.S. exercise of global power. 
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independent organ of the Organization of American States (OAS), based in Washington, DC, and 
composed of seven experts in human rights, appointed in their individual capacity. Together with 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, headquartered in San Jose, Costa Rica, the two 
bodies make up the regional human rights protection mechanism for the Americas. The United 
States, as an OAS member, is susceptible to the jurisdiction of the Commission (at least in the 
Commission’s view) but not the Court, because the U.S. has not ratified the principal human 
rights treaty of the Americas, the American Convention on Human Rights. The Commission uses 
its powers, inter alia, to hear contentious cases, to comment on human rights situations or issues, 
and to make local visits to countries in the Americas.19 
The petition was filed on February 25, 2002, just after the first detainees began arriving at 
the base in Cuba, asked that the United States government take precautionary measures20 to 
determine the status and protect the human rights of detainees then held incommunicado. No 
names, no exact numbers of persons, and no countries of origin were known publically at this 
point, and no communication was permitted by detainees with the outside world.21 The 
Commission quickly issued its decision on March 12, 2002. It called on the United States to 
“take the urgent measures necessary to have the legal rights of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
determined by a competent tribunal.” Given the doubt that existed about the status of the 
                                                 
19
 There are many more treaties on human rights in the region of the Americas, and this thumbnail sketch of the 
Commission’s powers only begins to document its many roles in human rights protection. The United States 
government has never accepted the claim by the Commission that the U.S. is susceptible to Commission jurisdiction. 
I have written about the issue of U.S. exceptionalism and the Inter-American human rights system elsewhere in this 
law review. Richard J. Wilson, The United States' Position on the Death Penalty in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, 42 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1159 (2002).  
20
 Precautionary measures are explained more fully infra, at text accompanying n. 162. 
21
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Request by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the Human 
Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Justice and International Law for Precautionary 
Measures under Article 25 of the Commission’s Regulations, February 25, 2002 (on file with the author).  
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detainees in international law, the need for resolution by a competent tribunal was urgent.22 The 
decision was the first of its kind by any adjudicative body, domestic or international, to address 
the human rights of the detainees. It reiterated a well-established framework for its analysis: 
“international human rights law applies at all times, in peacetime and in situations of armed 
conflict.” In times of armed conflict, the Commission asserted, “no person . . . is devoid of legal 
protection for his or her fundamental and non-derogable human rights.”23 Moreover, the 
Commission anticipated the extraterritorial jurisdiction aspect of the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush24 by more than two years, by grounding its decision on 
the jurisdictional concept that the United States exercised exclusive control over the detainees, 
even if the detainees were non-U.S. nationals outside of U.S. territory: “The determination of a 
state's responsibility for violations of the international human rights of a particular individual 
turns not on that individual's nationality or presence within a particular geographic area, but 
rather on whether, under the specific circumstances, that person fell within the state's authority 
and control.”25 
The United States government took its first public position on the framework within 
which the legal status of Guantanamo detainees should be determined in its initial submission to 
the Commission, which was transmitted to the petitioners on April 12, 2002.26 In that document, 
the government asserted that “international human rights law is not applicable to the conduct of 
hostilities or the capture and detention of enemy combatants, which are governed by the more 
                                                 
22
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 41 I.L.M. 532, 533 (2002).  
23
 Id., at 533.  
24
 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484, n. 15 (detainees  “have been held in executive detention for more than two years 
in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel 
and without being charged with any wrongdoing”).  
25
 Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, supra n. 23, at 532, n. 7. 
26
 Response of the United States to Request for Precautionary Measures – Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, April 15, 
2002, on file with the author.  
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specific laws of armed conflict.”27 International human rights law, in the view of the U.S. 
government, does not apply at all, being pre-empted by the law of war, in this case the war on 
terror. At least one scholar writing on this position asserts unequivocally that it is wrong: “In 
time of armed conflict or other emergency, at a minimum states are obliged to protect a ‘core’ of 
rights under treaty and customary human right law. .  .”28 Another scholar leaves the issue 
technically unresolved, but leaning against the United States. Gary Solis, a former military 
lawyer, notes the American position, then states: “Many disagree, particularly Europeans, the 
ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross], the ICJ [International Court of Justice], and 
human rights activists from anywhere.”29 To the extent that international human rights law does 
not apply at all in situations of armed conflict, the rights of children would of course be 
significantly diminished.    
The international law relating to the status and treatment of soldiers and civilians is found 
principally in the four Geneva Conventions and their two additional protocols, as well as in other 
treaties and customary humanitarian law, all of which seek to make more humane the horror of 
war. But the most central issue in the Khadr case arises not from the Geneva Convention texts, 
but from an older, customary law norm, that of the combatant’s privilege, which allows 
legitimate combatants to kill and wound each other without penalty; what would be a crime in 
peacetime is permitted in war.30 One of the most basic yet curious things about the prosecution 
of Omar Khadr, and one of the questions most often asked by friends and colleagues alike, 
lawyer and non-lawyer, was how Omar could be prosecuted for allegedly killing a soldier during 
                                                 
27
 Id., at 21.  
28
 HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (2005). 
29
 GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 24 (2010) 
(footnotes omitted).  
30
 Id. at 41-42. 
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battle, where the combatant’s privilege should apply. That would be true, military commission 
prosecutors argued, if one were a legitimate combatant, but Omar and his fellow detainees were 
first defined as “enemy combatants,” and later, under the Obama administration, as the 
aforementioned “alien unprivileged enemy belligerents.” It was originally this designation that 
came into controversy as the justification for holding U.S. detainees indefinitely, outside of a war 
zone, and subject to “enhanced” interrogation techniques that included repeated waterboarding. 
These were not soldiers entitled to POW status, according to the government, but terrorists who 
would be “treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, 
in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Convention.”31 That gapping exception 
for “military necessity” has created no end of legal problems for both the detainees and 
successive presidential administrations in Washington.  
Whatever the nuance added by this novel classification, the charge of murder of a U.S. 
soldier during combat, as a war crime allegedly committed by an unlawful child combatant – the 
basis of the Khadr prosecution – tested its limits.32 Lt. Col. David Frakt, who served as lead 
defense counsel in other military commission proceedings and now teaches law, argued 
successfully in at least two commission cases that the classification of “enemy combatant” itself 
“conflated two different concepts — unprivileged belligerents and war criminals.”33 He argues 
that: 
                                                 
31
 Brian Tittemore, Guantanamo Bay and the Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights: A Case for International Oversight in the Struggle Against Terrorism, 6 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 378, 387 (2006). 
32
 It is not my primary purpose to focus here on this debate, which has been the subject of whole shelves of law 
review articles on the notion of the combatant’s privilege in domestic and international armed conflict. I will instead 
focus on more particularly on the issue of the Guantanamo detainees’ ages, something that no international or 
domestic tribunal seriously undertook, or undertook and rejected.  
33
 The two commission cases involved Mohamed Jawad, discussed in this article, and Ali Hamza al Bahlul. David 
J.R. Frakt, Faculty website at Berry University, Andreas School of Law, at 
http://www.barry.edu/law/future/faculty/dfrakt.htm, visited on January 7, 2012.  
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Under Article 4 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention it is clear that while a 
member of an organized resistance movement or militia may be an unprivileged 
belligerent (because of not wearing a uniform or failing to carry arms openly, for 
example) he may still comply with the laws and customs of war, so not all hostile 
acts committed by unprivileged belligerents are war crimes. Attacks by 
unprivileged belligerents which comply with the law of war (in that they attack 
lawful military targets with lawful weapons) may only be tried in domestic courts. 
In Iraq, for example, insurgents who try to kill Americans by implanting roadside 
bombs are properly arrested and tried before the Central Criminal Court of Iraq as 
common criminals. Attacks by unprivileged belligerents which violate the law of 
war, such as attacks on civilians or soldiers attempting to surrender, or using 
prohibited weapons like poison gas, can be tried in a war crimes tribunal.34 
In her report on the Khadr guilty plea, the NGO activist lawyer Andrea Prasow put it 
more succinctly: “It’s a novel legal argument: Merely engaging in battle as an insurgent rather 
than a member of the regular army has never made battlefield conduct a war crime.”35 A 
definitive review of these charges, however, will never occur. Even had there been such an 
appeal, it is not likely to have settled the question.    
This unique and novel issue was only one of myriad issues in the context of international 
humanitarian law that arose for detainees. Those included the legitimacy of new tribunals created 
from whole cloth after 9/11, primarily Combat Status Review Tribunals, which were used to 
determine detainee status in Guantanamo, and military commissions with their attendant 
appellate review mechanisms or lack thereof. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
found that the military commission scheme set up by the executive branch as of 2006 (and under 
which Omar had first been charged), violated one of the core provisions of international 
humanitarian law as read through U.S. military law, that of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, which requires “a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees 
                                                 
34
 David Frakt, New Manual for Military Commissions Disregards the Commander-in-Chief, Congressional Intent 
and the Laws of War, Huffington Post, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-frakt/new-manual-for-military-
c_b_557720.html, April 29, 2010, visited on August 27, 2011.  
35
 Andrea Prasow, The Child Soldier on Trial at Guantanamo, http: //www.hrw.org/print/news/2010/10/27/child-
soldier-trial-guantanamo, Oct. 27, 2010, visited on August 23, 2011.  
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which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”36 The message of Hamdan was not 
lost on the Bush administration. Although not addressed in that decision, the same Common 
Article 3 also extends protection to all persons from “cruel treatment and torture; [and] outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”37 It was the 
mistreatment of detainees, first at Abu Ghraib and then at Guantanamo, that outraged the world 
and turned public opinion against Bush-era anti-terrorism policies. More than trials of terrorists, 
it was the risk of loss of evidence obtained through torture in court, as well as possible 
prosecution of interrogators for their abusive treatment of detainees, that drove the Bush 
administration to seek quick passage by a Republican-controlled Congress of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006.  
At bottom, international humanitarian law has had little to do with what happens to 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay. For a tiny handful of the nearly 800 men there over time, a 
conviction by plea or trial has ironically been the key to their release, as will be the case with 
Omar Khadr. For another small group, death, by suicide or for other reasons, provided the only 
way out. For the vast majority, release by repatriation or transfer to a third country came at the 
absolute discretion of the United States government. Such appears to be the case for the 
remaining detainees, as not a single court decision ordering the release of a detainee via a habeas 
corpus action has resulted in transfer from Guantanamo on those grounds. One can assume, 
however, that the nearly 600 transfers carried out by two presidential administrations are in part 
the result of the legal pressure asserted by habeas litigation.    
                                                 
36
 Hamdan, supra n. 8, at 602. Precisely, the Court found that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, through its 
Article 21, had incorporated the common law of war by reference, thus allowing for the application of Common 
Article 3.  
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B. The Law: Children in Armed Conflict 
International law with regard to the rights of children is quite extensive, as will be further 
developed below, but comes primarily from two treaty sources that are most relevant here. The 
first is the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”). That treaty, which has been ratified 
by every country of the world save the United States and Somalia, defines a child as anyone 
below the age of 18.38 Two articles of the CRC deal with children in armed conflict. Article 38 
calls on states parties to refrain from recruiting children under the age of 15 for military service, 
or using children under 15 directly in hostilities. If between 15 and 18, states are called on to 
give priority to recruitment of the oldest first. The article explicitly calls on states parties to 
“respect and ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to [the child] in 
armed conflicts.”39 As such, Article 38 is a kind of “hybrid” article: it is “clearly an IHL 
provision. Yet formally speaking, Article 38 is part of a human rights instrument.”40 Article 39 
states that the parties “shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological 
recovery and social reintegration of a child victim” of armed conflict.41 Another article deals 
with children deprived of their liberty. Article 37 calls on states parties to keep detained children 
separated from adults “unless it is in the child’s best interests not to do so.” It further requires the 
right to outside communication with family and to legal assistance.42  
This framework is further developed in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (“Protocol on Child 
Soldiers” or “Optional Protocol”). The Optional Protocol, formally ratified by the United States 
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 Id. Art. 38. 
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on December 23, 2002, raises the age of recruitment and direct participation of children from 15 
to 18, bringing it into line with the broadest definition of a child in the CRC.43 Most importantly 
for purposes of the discussion here, the Protocol, in Article 6(3), provides that states parties 
“shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used 
in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service. 
States Parties shall, when necessary, accord to such persons all appropriate assistance for their 
physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.” Article 7(1) further provides 
that the states parties “shall cooperate in the implementation of the present Protocol, including in 
the prevention of any activity contrary to the Protocol and in the rehabilitation and social 
reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary to this Protocol.”   
Additional international humanitarian law applies to Omar’s situation, most of which 
comes not from the four Geneva Conventions, but from Article 77 of Additional Protocol I, 
which deals explicitly with situations of children in international armed conflict. Again, 
however, the United States has not ratified the additional protocols, which means that most 
arguments we made on behalf of children under humanitarian law were made as customary 
international law.44 Moreover, Article 77 uses “under 15” language in referring to children, 
which is not helpful to Omar Khadr, who was captured at age 15. Many activists push for what is 
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 The United States, which permits enlistment in military service at age 17 under some circumstances, has taken 
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called the “Straight 18” position, which would bar recruitment or use of all child soldiers under 
age 18, and “international law’s trend-line arcs toward the Straight 18 horizon.”45 
Two well-known and respected sets of non-binding principles also apply to children in 
situations of armed conflict, the Cape Town Principles of 1997, and a sequel, the Paris Principles 
of 2007.46 Finally, although not explicitly related to children in armed conflict, the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked concepts from neuroscience on the cognitive 
development of children in decisions mitigating punishment and protecting the rights of children, 
including the decision excerpted in the heading to this article.47 Those decisions employ the same 
underlying rationale regarding the reasons not to hold juvenile soldiers to the same standards as 
adults.  
C. Other Children in US Detention at Guantanamo and Elsewhere  
The exact number of children detained at Guantanamo has yet to be fully clarified. Totals 
have ranged from as few as six to over 60 – the former number from the government and the 
latter from the activist world.48 The most reliable count appears to be that compiled by journalist 
Andy Worthington, who documents 28 juvenile detainees at Guantanamo based on materials 
posted to Wikileaks. The Worthington data show that most of the youthful detainees were 
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 Drumbl, supra n. 4, at 11. Mention African Charter on Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
46
 UNICEF, Cape Town Principles and Best Practices, 27-30 April 1997; Principles and Guidelines on Children 
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Akron L. Rev. 917 (2009).  
48
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transferred back to their home countries. One juvenile detainee died at Guantanamo “under 
mysterious circumstances” suggestive of suicide, and two, other than Omar Khadr, have been the 
subject of judicial proceedings described in more detail below.49  
 In 2003, there was a storm of controversy and publicity over the discovery that there were 
at least three children on the base. Omar Khadr was not included in that count.50 The press 
conference with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, excerpted in a headnote to this article, 
arose in the wake of that discovery. The children in question, thought to be between 13 and 15, 
were quickly removed from the adult population and relocated to Camp Iguana, part of the 
detention complex of buildings, where they enjoyed relative freedom and more comfortable 
conditions pending their transfer home. The boys were quietly returned to their homes in 
Afghanistan in early 2004.51 The extensive attention by the media to the detention of children, as 
well as the after-the-fact hushed responses by the government, infer that officials knew that the 
detention of children at all, let alone with adults, was improper, if not illegal.  
 Two judicial resolutions other than the Khadr case, one from the federal courts and one 
from a military commission, dealt with juveniles held at Guantanamo. The first, El Gharani v. 
Bush,52 was quite simple and straightforward. Mohammed el Gharani, a native of Saudi Arabia 
and citizen of Chad, was captured by Pakistanis and turned over to the U.S. in early 2002. El 
Gharani sought his release via habeas corpus petition to U.S. District Court judge Richard Leon. 
Age was not a factor in Judge Leon’s decision to order el Gharani’s release, which turned on the 
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 Andy Worthington, WikiLeaks and the 22 Children of Guantanamo, at 
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sufficiency of the government’s evidence. The only mention of juvenile status at the time of 
capture came in a single line of the decision, stating that the petitioner “claims to have traveled to 
Pakistan from Saudi Arabia at the age of 14 to escape discrimination against Chadians in that 
country.”53 Age may have played a role in the judge’s analysis, but not on the record. The boy 
was released from Guantanamo in June of 2009.54  
 Such was not the case with the other decision, which involved a detainee named 
Mohamed Jawad. Jawad was arrested in 2002 for allegedly throwing a hand grenade into a 
vehicle carrying two U.S. military personnel and their interpreter in Afghanistan, resulting in 
serious injuries to all. While his exact age at the time of his arrest is unclear, the government 
admitted he was under 18 years old at the time of his arrest. During interrogation by Afghan 
officials following his arrest, he was told that he and his family would be killed if he didn’t 
confess. He confessed to the crime and was turned over to the U.S. military, which transferred 
him to Guantanamo and charged him with various crimes to be tried by military commission.55 
The presiding officer denied a motion to dismiss charges based on the accused’s status as a child 
soldier, but that motion was grounded almost entirely in domestic law.56 The presiding officer 
did, however, grant a motion to suppress Jawad’s statements to Afghan authorities, finding the 
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threat to kill his family “credible,” and further concluding that that the threats and intimidation 
amounted to torture, given “the Accused’s age and the then reputation of the Afghan police as 
corrupt and violent.”57 Undeterred, the government determined to proceed with the case, only to 
lose a challenge to Jawad’s detention via habeas corpus in the federal district court of 
Washington, D.C.58 Charges against Jawad eventually were dropped, and he was repatriated to 
Afghanistan in August of 2009.59 Age played a clear role in the decision by the presiding officer 
to suppress Jawad’s statements; there is little doubt that age played a role in Mohamed Jawad’s 
success in pursuing habeas corpus relief, as well as in his eventual release. Skirmishing in the 
case over disclosure of favorable evidence to the defense gave rise to the resignation of the chief 
military prosecutor, Lt. Col. Darrell L. Vandeveld, whose eloquent statement is excerpted as 
another headnote to this paper.60 
The U.S. detention of juveniles in armed conflicts is not unique to Guantanamo. In 
answer to a written question from the Committee on the Rights of the Child in June of 2008 
about how many juveniles were detained at Guantanamo and other US detention facilities, the 
government responded that it “does not currently detain any juveniles at Guantanamo Bay;” that 
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it had held 90 juveniles in Afghanistan (10 currently); and that it had held approximately 2,400 
juveniles in Iraq (500 currently).61 
D. Children as Defendants in War Crimes Trials in History62 
Many statements were made in the media and elsewhere, in the pre-trial stages of the 
Khadr commission proceedings, regarding the historical record of trials of children for war 
crimes. Most typical were dramatic assertions that Omar’s trial would be the first such trial in 
modern history, or since World War II, or ever.63 This brief subsection includes information on 
the detention or trials of children in armed conflict in history, and refutes the contentions 
regarding the unprecedented nature of the Khadr trial while affirming that no prior history 
justifies U.S. judicial action against Omar Khadr.  
Children have been a part of armed conflicts throughout much of American history 
before the Twentieth Century. Regulations of the U.S. Army in 1813 specified that “healthy, 
active boys between the ages of 14 and 18 could be enlisted as musicians with parental 
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consent.”64 Boy soldiers served as musicians, cooks, messengers, porters, spies, and sometimes 
as fighters during the U.S. Civil War, where boys in uniform ranged in age from 8 to 16.65 Boys 
of 14 and above were routinely permitted to serve or actively recruited into the Confederate 
army, particularly as the war ground on into 1864 and the South’s position became more 
desparate.66 Some children were detained as prisoners of war on both sides. One well-known boy 
prisoner of 13 or 14 at Andersonville, the South’s most infamous prison, was called “Red Cap” 
and became a personal aide to the camp’s commander, Henry Wirz.67 In prisons of the North, 
such as Fort Delaware, boys of 16 foraged for food, contracted measles, and sometimes died of 
congestion of the lungs and other diseases.68 Legal actions occasionally involved these boys, but 
not for their prosecution; habeas corpus applications “inundated” the courts, filed by parents 
seeking to gain the release of their sons from military service.69 
In the American west during the Civil War, a military commission tried nearly 400 
Dakota Indians for their actions against white settlers in Minnesota. Carol Chomsky documents 
these trials,70 while another scholar of the commission proceedings records the trial and 
conviction of several Dakota Indian boys between 14 and 18; at least one fourteen-year-old boy 
was hanged.71 The trial of Wowinape, a boy of 16, was one of the most curious. He was 
convicted by the commission and sentenced to hang, but his sentence was later overturned by a 
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superior officer. Prof. Chomsky suggests that the overturning of the sentence may well have had 
to do with Wowinape’s age and the fact that he “had done no more than fight in battles.”72 
Children were the subjects of war-time trials in World War II, although the evidence as to 
whether these were trials for war crimes is ambiguous. While some partisans fighting in Europe 
were children, young boys became part of the fighting forces of Germany, particularly in the 
Hitler Youth and Volkssturm, literally People’s Storm, a militia that drafted children as young as 
ten during 1945, the last year of the war.73 Starting in January of 1943, anti-aircraft batteries 
were manned by Hitler Youth of fifteen.74 One Hitler Youth operation involved dropping boy 
suicide commandos behind enemy lines in occupied Germany to reverse Allied gains there. Two 
“Werewolves,” as they were known, were captured behind American lines. Heinz Petry, sixteen, 
and Josef Schörner, seventeen, were tried as spies by the American troops, condemned to death 
and executed.75  
 During Guantanamo commission proceedings on the motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction over juveniles, to be fully discussed below, the defense asserted in its motion that 
“no international tribunal established under the laws of war, from Nuremberg forward, has ever 
prosecuted former child soldiers as war criminals.”76 The prosecution responded by citing three 
cases purporting to prosecute children for war crimes during or after World War II.77 The 
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prosecution asserted that in Trial of Johannes Oenning & Emil Nix,78 a British Military Court in 
Borken, Germany prosecuted Oenning, said to be a 15-year-old member of the Hitler Youth, for 
his involvement in the murder of a Royal Air Force Officer. And in Trial of Alois & Anna 
Bommer & and Their Daughters,79 the Permanent Military Tribunal at Metz, Germany tried two 
daughters under 18, convicted with another sister and their parents for war crimes. The two were 
convicted and imprisoned. Finally, the prosecution referred to an article citing the war crimes 
trial of Josef Kramer and others, known as the Belsen Case. There, one of the accused was said 
to be Antoni Aurdzieg, “as young as 16 at the time of his vicious offenses.”80 
 The defense responded that a trial transcript in the Belson case showed that Aurdzieg was 
20 years old, not 16; that the two Bommer daughters and their remaining family were tried under 
the French Penal Code; and that Oenning was tried by a British occupation commission, not a 
law-of-war commission, as with Omar Khadr.81 They might also have noted that all of these 
proceedings took place before adoption of the now-universally respected Geneva Conventions 
regime. The presiding judge made no mention of any of these historic cases in his decision on the 
defense motion.82 
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 There is, however, one troubling modern case that was not mentioned in the Khadr 
litigation or anywhere else, to the best of the author’s knowledge. It involves the trial and 
conviction of a boy of 14 at the time of his offenses by a special UN-administered court in East 
Timor. In 2000, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) created the 
Special Court for East Timor, Indonesia, which heard cases brought by the Serious Crimes Unit 
(SCU) against persons responsible for crimes against humanity and other serious crimes 
committed in East Timor. The Special Court’s composition was one Timorese and two 
international judges.83 The Rules of Procedure of the tribunals allowed the prosecution of minors 
between 12 and 16 years of age, if done in accordance with special rules relating to juvenile 
justice.84  
A young boy identified in the file only as “X” to protect his privacy and reputation, was 
arrested in October 2001, and was later charged by indictment from the SCU with extermination 
and attempted extermination, both crimes against humanity under the terms of the Special 
Tribunal. The facts, though somewhat scant, indicate that X made a statement to police that he 
had been forced to join a militia in September of 1999 at age 14. He had traveled with the militia 
into West Timor, where they found 75 young men tied up as prisoners. After a forced march of 
the prisoners, supervised by adult leaders of the militia, he was ordered to kill three prisoners and 
beaten when he did not comply promptly. He admitted to having killed three men with a 
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machete; 47 men in total were killed by the militia that night. After these events, X left and went 
home.85 
The record of case indicates that X pleaded guilty to murder “in violation of article 338 of 
the Indonesian Penal Code” in October 2002.86 X was later sentenced to 12 months 
imprisonment, with credit for 11 months served in pretrial confinement, and the remaining 
month suspended.87 The report on the trial notes the lenience of the panel, showing that “it had 
taken into account not only the age of the accused but also the fact the accused did not act out of 
his/her own initiative.”88 The actual judgment in the case also notes action on superior orders, no 
prior criminal record, and the plea of guilty as mitigating factors. It is clearer from the judgment 
text itself that the charge to which X pleaded guilty was the domestic crime of manslaughter, a 
lesser degree of homicide than murder, with a less harsh punishment range. 89 From October of 
2002 on, the boy was released from custody so that he might attend school.90 The case is 
troubling because it was conducted quite recently, and under the auspices of the UN, which 
purportedly seeks to limit the prosecution of minors. Moreover, the original charge was crimes 
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against humanity, an international crime. On the other hand, the sentence imposed recognizes the 
age of the accused, and is for a common crime in domestic law, not a war crime.  
Suffice it to say that from World War II on, war crimes trials of juveniles were and are 
certainly the rare exception, particularly given the estimated numbers of child soldiers 
worldwide. In the Sierra Leone Special Tribunal, the chief prosecutor announced that he would 
not prosecute juveniles.91 In the Statute of the International Criminal Court, no one under 18 
years of age can be prosecuted at all.92 And in 2006, a UN Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights recommended that “in no case . . 
. should minors [under the age of 18] be placed under the jurisdiction of military courts.”93 The 
historical trend is away from the prosecution of children in armed conflict. Countries that honor 
the spirit of the Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers will not prosecute children under 18, or will 
prosecute with protections commensurate with international norms of juvenile justice, taking into 
account the age of the alleged offender. 
II. Omar Khadr as a child in the federal courts: habeas corpus challenges 
In June of 2004, the United States Supreme Court held, in Rasul v. Bush,94 that the 
federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the claims of detainees at Guantanamo Bay via the writ of 
habeas corpus, and that venue would lie in Washington, D.C. Within days of that decision, I 
requested a case from the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a dynamic non-governmental 
group in New York that had been collecting claims from the families of detainees. I was joined 
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in representation by another clinical faculty colleague, with plans that we would manage the case 
as part of our docket in the International Human Rights Law Clinic. CCR happily assigned us the 
Omar Khadr case, to be handled on a purely pro bono basis, but with coordination and back-up 
to be provided by CCR staff.95  
Nothing in the litigation of the federal district court claims by detainees was easy; the 
government, through both the Department of Justice and the Pentagon, fought against access to 
the courts for the detainees and their lawyers on every conceivable issue, every step of the way. 
One initial administrative step was the government’s effort to consolidate the pending habeas 
cases, then only eleven, for disposition of common issues. That effort was successful, although 
individual district court judges had the authority either to pull their cases off of the common 
docket for their own disposition, or to hear individual petitions for relief on discreet issues. Our 
team therefor proceeded on two fronts in federal court, one chosen and one mandated: we chose 
to litigate two matters before our assigned judge, the Honorable John Bates, while our common 
claims were heard, on common briefing, by the Honorable Joyce Hens Green, who stepped out 
of senior status to hear this single matter.  
Almost immediately after our assignment of the case, I began research on the issue of 
children in armed conflict, with particular focus on two treaties ratified by the United States and 
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immediately enforceable obligations arising under those treaties: the Optional Protocol on Child 
Soldiers and the International Labor Organization’s Convention 182, Concerning the Prohibition 
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (hereafter “ILO 
Convention 182” or “Child Labor Convention”). Among the many issues that we prepared to 
litigate that fall, the issue of Omar’s status as a child in armed conflict was high on the list. Our 
amended petition for relief through habeas corpus incorporated both a first allegation regarding 
the absence of jurisdiction in Guantanamo over minors, as well as an allegation that Omar’s 
detention was unlawful and arbitrary under international humanitarian and human rights law 
protecting juveniles.96 However, the opportunities for raising such claims, we soon discovered, 
were often overshadowed by broader or seemingly more urgent issues.   
Judge Green’s consolidated case gave us one of the earliest opportunities to hear the 
government’s position on Omar’s status as a child. The judge ordered a large pre-hearing 
conference meeting of all counsel in her chambers in late August of 2004, within weeks after the 
consolidation order. At that meeting, we noted that our client was a child, detained at age 15. 
Judge Green professed surprise to hear this and asked the government to provide her with 
information regarding the situation of minors at Guantanamo and any steps to provide them with 
special accommodations. We followed up with a letter to government counsel that day, and 
received their reply on September 3, 2004.97 The letter indicated that as of that date, “no 
detainees known to be younger than age 16 are detained at Guantanamo Bay,” a statement 
crafted to focus on current age rather than age at the time of initial capture or detention. The 
letter also said that the government’s policy was to provide special treatment of detainees under 
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the age of 16 at the time of their arrival, pointing to the three Afghan juveniles who had been 
moved into the comforts of Camp Iguana and later released after the international press 
discovered their presence there. Again, however, the letter failed to note that detainees 16 and up 
were treated as adults for purposes of status and treatment, particularly for protracted and 
“enhanced” interrogations. Moreover, the letter ironically referred only to international law to 
defend government policy, while the government pursued an aggressive posture of barring the 
detainees themselves from invoking humanitarian law for their defense. The letter stated that 
“the law of armed conflict does not define with precision the age at which a combatant is 
considered a child or adult. Generally accepted norms in the field,” it went on to say, “including 
the Geneva Conventions and other international protocols to which the United States is a party, 
while not specifically addressing the issue of combatants who are minors, recognize that during a 
time of war civilians and individuals under the age of 15 are accorded different treatment that 
persons who are older.” We responded immediately to their letter on each of these issues, 
pointing out that the government had implied recognition of its ratification of the Protocol on 
Child Soldiers, which Congress explicitly made self-executing,98 and that the Protocol made 
rehabilitation and reintegration into society of children in armed conflict the primary purpose of 
that instrument.99 Similarly, ILO Convention 182, also self-executing, in its Article 4, condemns 
“the forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict” as a form of forced 
labor.  
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We received no response from the court to this exchange of correspondence. We 
attempted to raise the issue of Omar’s status as a child in armed conflict again in briefing on the 
issue of the government’s motion to dismiss all detainee claims. Unfortunately, however, our one 
child’s claims were overwhelmed by the common claims of all of the detainees jointly, which 
were briefed with a specific page limit. Our reiterated claims under the Protocol and ILO 
Convention 182 were relegated to a single footnote in the section arguing that international law 
claims could be vindicated by habeas corpus.100  
Judge Green’s decision in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,101 on January 31, 2004, 
which generally upheld the detainee’s right to proceed on habeas corpus grounds, made national 
and international news, and eventually, after winding, protracted appeals and joinder of cases, 
became the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in Boumediene v. Bush.102 With this generally 
good news from Judge Green, however, came bad news for Omar Khadr. First, Judge Green 
almost immediately imposed a stay regarding any further action by the detainees during the 
protracted process of appellate review of her decision.103 Moreover, her decision itself, in a little-
noted paragraph toward the end of a long opinion, dismissed without discussion “the remaining 
treaty-based claims” other than her narrow holding with regard to the application of the Geneva 
Conventions, and declined to reach claims under customary international law, as “unnecessary . . 
. to resolve the petitioners’ claims.”104 We were denied a forum to reach the issue of Omar’s 
status as a child in armed conflict. 
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During those early stages of the litigation, and despite the stay, we pursued two separate 
claims for relief on Omar’s behalf under habeas jurisdiction, filed before District Judge John 
Bates. Both proceeded as cases involving minors, thus using Omar’s initials “O.K.” as his only 
designation in court filings, despite widespread and growing attention to his case in the media. 
Both were decided against us, and no appeals were pursued. The first, a motion for emergency 
medical access and for production of medical records, was filed on August 10, 2004.105 Though 
cast as “emergency,” the motion lingered on the judge’s docket more than two months, and was 
resolved against Omar in a decision which addressed itself largely to issues of his mental 
competence to stand trial, an issue we had neither raised nor briefed.106 At the end of the 
decision, Judge Bates wrote that the case may be read to raise a “broader and more sweeping 
claim,” one regarding the court’s “affirmative responsibility to ensure the physical and mental 
well-being of petitioner, in light of his status as a minor, his serious physical injuries, [and] the 
views of many that conditions at Guantanamo are too harsh (and inappropriate for juveniles).” 
While we had focused heavily on Omar’s status as a minor as a factor justifying judicial 
intervention for his protection, we had not raised the claim in those broad terms. The court 
nonetheless rejected those arguments as well, expressing a reluctance to “second-guess the 
medical treatment provided to prisoners by government officials.”107 Finally, in perhaps its most 
disingenuous ruling, the court found that whatever relief might have been justified when he was 
a child, petitioner was now an adult “seeking only prospective relief in the form of medical 
assessment.”108 That reasoning ignored the simple fact that no detainee had access to counsel or 
the courts for up to three years, and that fact-gathering in Guantanamo occurred in the most 
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onerous conditions for counsel and client. If Omar was an adult, it was because of the 
government’s vigorous efforts to deter advocacy on his behalf.  
  A second action was filed in March of 2005, originally seeking injunctive relief to 
prevent ongoing torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment during interrogations, 
and later amended by a similar claim seeking to prevent Omar’s possible rendition from 
Guantanamo to another country without judicial approval.109 This action faced an additional 
hurdle due to the existence of Judge Green’s stay in the case; it sought to lift the stay due to 
extraordinary circumstances. It too failed. Again, we did not explicitly challenge Omar’s status 
as a juvenile in that proceeding. We did invoke provisions of the Convention against Torture, 
which the U.S. had ratified and implemented,110 as well as those of Article 77(1) of Protocol 1 to 
the Geneva Conventions, which provides that “[c]hildren shall be the object of special respect 
and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault. The Parties to the conflict shall 
provide them with the care and aid they require, whether because of their age or for any other 
reason.”111  
In a July decision that year, Judge Bates again rejected our arguments seeking 
intervention, concluding that we had shown no real and immediate threat of future mistreatment 
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similar to that which had occurred previously.112 The ruling was conspicuously devoid of any 
mention of or reliance on international law. The court found that “the fact that the petitioner was 
a minor when many of the alleged incidents occurred does not change this analysis. His status as 
a minor does not make the allegations of mistreatment any more likely to occur again in the 
future.” The court also reiterated his earlier holding that because relief was prospective only and 
thus not available to Omar as an adult. 113 
Judge Bates was to have one more opportunity to directly address the issue of Omar’s 
status as a child affected by armed conflict, although not during our representation of him. 
Omar’s newly appointed military lawyers simultaneously sought to dismiss charges before a 
reconstituted military commission on grounds of Omar’s juvenile status while also seeking to 
enjoin those proceedings in the federal court habeas process, on grounds that his trial was barred 
as a juvenile, or alternatively that he be transferred from adult to juvenile detention and placed in 
an appropriate rehabilitation and reintegration program.114 Once again, Omar’s team failed to 
persuade Judge Bates, although this time he avoided the questions rather than answering them 
adversely the petitioner. 
Omar’s team made three arguments.115 First, they argued that the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, enacted quickly by Congress after the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hamdan decision, did 
not confer personal jurisdiction for the trial of juveniles. Second, they argued that Omar’s 
designation as an “enemy combatant” was inconsistent with U.S. and international law, as a child 
cannot be a “member” “affiliate” or “associate” of an armed group. Third, they argued that even 
if his detention was lawful, the law of war required that Omar be placed in a rehabilitation and 
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reintegration program appropriate for former child soldiers. The last claim was grounded 
primarily in the language of the Protocol on Child Soldiers. 
Judge Bates largely adopted the arguments of the government; he abstained on the first 
two questions and found that he was statutorily prohibited from deciding the third. He found that 
the pending proceedings in a military commission had priority over his review of the first two 
issues, and that those remedies must be exhausted before he could validly consider them.116 As to 
the third issue, he found that he had no jurisdiction to hear such claims, pursuant to provisions of 
the Military Commissions Act that barred review by the courts.117 This last conclusion seems the 
most problematic. While the court found that this request “comes closer to the heart of the writ 
than does a request for a blanket or a mattress,” it still essentially constituted an “on base transfer 
to a less restrictive detention facility.”118 When characterized as a challenge to conditions of 
confinement, the claim fell within the ambit of a provision of the new law that barred federal 
courts from review of such claims. Moreover, the court’s invocation of a “conditions of 
confinement” neatly allowed it to avoid any issue of treaty interpretation or, more generally, of 
international law at all.  
If a claim for transfer into rehabilitation under the Protocol on Child Soldiers constitutes 
a mere claim for change of conditions of confinement, the treaty is rendered ineffectual to 
accomplish a core provision. Treatment of juveniles within the U.S. legal system provides a 
useful analogy. If a crime is committed by a minor, whatever the state or federal law defining the 
age for such persons, the child is treated as a juvenile offender, subject to an entirely different 
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regime of adjudication and punishment.119 While the child may be transferred into adult 
jurisdiction, that transfer requires a judicial determination changing the status of the minor from 
child to adult for purposes of jurisdiction.120 Thus, a transfer from juvenile to adult confinement 
is not only a change in conditions but a change in status; it is the nature of the claimant, not the 
nature of the claim that defines the transition. The same should have been true in the 
determination to treat Omar Khadr as a juvenile for purposes of the Protocol. In any event, no 
appeal was taken from the decision of the district court. But Omar Khadr’s long saga for 
vindication of his rights as a child was not over. He also raised such claims in military 
commission proceedings.     
III. Omar Khadr as a child in military commission proceedings: pre-trial issues 
Military commission proceedings fundamentally change the posture of the claimant of 
rights. The claim in habeas corpus proceedings is governed by civil rules, with lesser burdens of 
proof for the government to justify ongoing detention, while military commission proceedings 
are criminal in nature, and the accused should enjoy all the rights of a defendant such as the 
presumption of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the prosecution. 
However, as established at Guantanamo, these specialized military tribunals were explicitly 
designed to make it easier for the government to convict, and very hard for the defendant to 
invoke the normal guarantees of due process and fair trial.121 Such failures are exactly what led 
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the United States Supreme Court, in the Hamdan decision, to strike down the commission system 
as fatally flawed. 
My faculty colleague and I, having represented Omar in federal court, continued to 
represent him as civilian counsel when he was charged, in November of 2005, by the first 
military commission, put into place by presidential order of George W. Bush.122 Under the rules 
of the commission as then constituted, all other actors in the proceedings – prosecution, judge 
and jury – were regular military personnel. The rules therefore required that, unlike courts 
martial, the accused was required to be represented by military lawyers; civilian lawyers were 
optional at the election of the accused. Omar was provided with two such lawyers, who 
collaborated with us until all commission proceedings were suspended after the Supreme Court 
heard oral arguments in the Hamdan case in the spring of 2006. 
The pre-trial proceedings in the first military commission process were abbreviated, 
lasting only a matter of months in our case before being stayed, but they merit mention for the 
claims raised relating to the issue of children in armed conflict. Our defense team filed some 45 
pre-trial motions challenging the jurisdiction or process of the commissions; some were broad 
and some very narrow. The prosecution responded to those motions, but no hearing was ever 
held on their merits; the commissions were struck down before a decision by the presiding 
officer. Four defense motions, 32 through 35, dealt with the issues of children in armed conflict 
charged with war crimes. The simplest was Motion 35, which called for use of the initials of the 
accused only, given his youth at the time of the offenses. The motion would have been largely 
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ineffectual, given the storm of media focus on any military commission proceedings at that time, 
and Omar Khadr’s name had been spread worldwide because of that enormous publicity.  
Motions 32 and 33 were similar in their challenges; 32 called for dismissal of the charges 
based on failure of commission procedures to provide for defenses or sentencing procedures for 
juveniles under age 18 at the time of their offenses, while 33 called for dismissal based on failure 
to prosecute Omar as a child at the time of his alleged offenses. Omar was 19 years old at the 
time of the motions. The arguments were grounded first in international human rights law. The 
U.S. had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and had 
signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which obligated the United States, at 
the very least, not to violate the object and purpose of the treaty, and arguably created obligations 
under customary international law,123 particularly because the U.S. had ratified the Optional 
Protocol on Child Soldiers. Both the ICCPR and CRC required special treatment for juveniles in 
general, and especially during criminal proceedings, where the goal of any adjudicatory process 
was to be rehabilitation and the best interests of the child. The complete failure of military 
commission procedures to acknowledge the special needs of juveniles made them fatally flawed 
regarding any child charged there.  
The prosecution responded, in essence, that no international instrument prohibits the 
government from holding someone criminally responsible for war crimes solely because he was 
15 years old at the time of the offense in question. It further argued, as had the U.S. government 
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in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, that international human rights law does 
not apply during armed conflict and the more specific lex specialis of international humanitarian 
law takes over completely.124  
Motion 35 argued for dismissal on grounds that the commission process failed to meet 
obligations to decommission, rehabilitate and reintegrate Omar into society, as a former child 
solder. Here, for the first time in the commission process, we argued the Protocol on Child 
Soldiers and ILO Convention 182 together with other international standards such as the Beijing 
Rules, the Tokyo Rules, and the Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice 
System. We also invoked Article 78 of Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions, arguing that Omar 
was not properly evacuated from the conflict zone in which he was captured. The prosecution’s 
argument can be summarized in a single sentence: none of the treaties or standards bar the 
United States from trying a 15 year old for war crimes. They argued that the instruments 
invoked, save the Protocol on Child Soldiers, were either non-binding or not treaties to which the 
U.S. was a party. The Protocol, they argued, did not prohibit prosecution of 15-year-olds. 
The Protocol on Child Soldiers, in its Article 6(3), provides that states parties “shall take 
all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in 
hostilities contrary to this Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service.” It goes 
on to require social reintegration for such persons. Two aspects of the Protocol are highlighted 
here: first, the obligations are mandatory (“shall”), not precatory; second, demobilization and 
reintegration are required when a child is under the physical control of the capturing state 
(“within their jurisdiction”). Article 7(1) again requires states to cooperate in implementation of 
the treaty: “States Parties shall cooperate in the implementation of the treaty, including . . . in the 
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rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary to this 
protocol.” The remainder of the treaty’s operative provisions refer only to persons under 18 years 
of age. There is no mention of trials for 15-year-old juveniles in the treaty, but the Protocol does 
contain language twice calling for measures to protect any juvenile “victim” under 18 and “used 
in hostilities” other than by trial; that is by rehabilitation and reintegration. But that issue, too, 
was left without resolution in the commission, which was struck down in its entirety in June. 
The issue of jurisdiction over children was finally settled for the military commission 
process by a ruling in April of 2008 on a defense motion arguing that the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 (hereafter “MCA”) failed to provide jurisdiction for the trial of juvenile crimes by a 
child soldier.125 By this point in the commission process, the Khadr case had attracted heavy 
international attention, and amicus briefs were filed on his behalf by three groups of lawmakers, 
scholars and non-governmental organizations.126 All were admitted and considered by the 
presiding officer. The defense raised three arguments. First, Omar’s team argued that neither the 
MCA nor any other military law extends to those who do not have lawful military status, and 
children under 18, under U.S. law, are incapable of obtaining such lawful status. As authority, 
the defense invoked domestic cases barring the military enlistment of minors under 18, who 
could never attain status as a member of the military. This argument was easily brushed aside, as 
the MCA refers to “persons” while the Uniform Code of Military Justice refers to “members of 
the armed forces.” As such, the presiding officer reasoned, decisions under the UCMJ have no 
relevance to commission proceedings. A second argument related to the application of the 
                                                 
125
 United States v. Khadr, D-22, Ruling on Defense Motion for Dismissal Due to Lack of Jurisdiction Under the 
MCA in Regard to Juvenile Crimes of a Child Soldier, 30 April 2008. Although difficult to search, the entire papers 
relating to the second military commission proceedings can be found at 
www.mc.mil/CASES/Military/Commissions.aspx, visited on Dec. 15, 2011.  
126
 Amici included Sen. Robert Badiner et al. (French parliamentarian and criminal defense lawyer); Canadian 
parliamentarians and law professors, and foreign legal associations; and the Juvenile Law Center. Id. at 1.   
Draft of January 9, 2012 
41 
 
federal Juvenile Detention Act to commission proceedings, and is not relevant to the discussion 
here.  
The third argument, however, was the heart of the matter. It again alleged that the 
Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers created state obligations similar to those raised in the first 
military commission proceeding, with additional detail on the applicable U.S. federal juvenile 
law. The presiding officer’s ruling, which denied the motion, is terse; it decides these important 
issues in a total of less than three pages of analysis. As to international law, the presiding officer 
found that “neither customary international law nor international treaties binding upon the United 
States prohibit the trial of a person for alleged violations of the law of nations committed when 
he was 15 years of age.”127 This is an issue that the defense had conceded in its reply,128 but 
argued that if prosecution was to proceed, it must be accompanied by protections of juveniles 
guaranteeing their rehabilitation and reintegration, and should be conducted under the domestic 
juvenile law.  
The decision is also interesting in at least three other respects. First, both the defense and 
commission used the silence of Congress on the issue of the trial of juveniles in the MCA to 
advance their arguments or conclusions based on principles of statutory interpretation. The 
defense argued that nothing prevented Congress from providing for the prosecution of minors, 
and yet the MCA failed to provide for such prosecutions; their silence was evidence that they did 
not wish trials of juveniles. While the presiding officer in the Khadr case did not address this 
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issue, the officer in Jawad, another commission case involving a juvenile, did. The presiding 
officer there found that because “both Mohammed Jawad and Omar Khadr have been in U.S. 
custody at Guantanamo Bay since 2002, a fact that Congress is aware of, Congress could have 
provided for an age requirement when enacting the [MCA]; it chose not to.”129 Generally, silence 
by Congress does not lend itself to easy statutory interpretation: not every silence is pregnant, as 
one authority argues.130  
 A second aspect of the decision denying the motion to dismiss is its improper invocation 
of the “last in time” rule in U.S. law. The decision finds that even though the Protocol is the law 
of the land, the adoption of the MCA comes later, and “a federal statute, passed after the 
ratification of a treaty, prevails over contrary provisions of a treaty.” As authority for this 
assertion, the presiding officer cites to an 1889 Supreme Court decision in the Chinese Exclusion 
cases.131 This may be true where, as cited, the provisions of the statute are contrary to the treaty, 
but if the two documents can be read together without conflict, courts should do so, according to 
the long-established rule of interpretation laid down in the Charming Betsy case.132 Here, the 
MCA is a general statute for the establishment of jurisdiction and rules of procedure. It is silent 
on the issue of the treatment of juveniles, while the Optional Protocol is specific on the treatment 
of juveniles. Here, silence in the statute leaves the courts to supplement that silence with the 
treaty source in order to provide faithful and consistent interpretation of governmental 
obligations. The later MCA, on its face, does not conflict with the earlier treaty, and says nothing 
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as to abrogation of obligations under the Optional Protocol, which the Congress explicitly found 
to be self-executing. 
 Finally, the commission declines to reach the crucial issues briefed by the defense and 
amici dealing with what the presiding officer calls “the United States’ duties and obligations 
concerning rehabilitation and reintegration of Mr. Khadr.” That issue, the commission concludes 
“should be addressed to a forum other than a military commission.”133 Alternatively, at least 
implicitly, the commission leaves this issue to the Convening Authority: “The Commission 
assumes, without deciding, that the Convening Authority considers the circumstances of each 
case and each accused before referring a case to trial. Whether or not being tried for alleged 
crimes is rehabilitative is not a question before this commission.”134 As noted earlier, the federal 
district court declined to hear this very same issue on grounds that it would be decided by the 
military commission first. Thus, this particular child challenging proceedings under the Optional 
Protocol was left without any forum to address the issue, as both defer to other authorities.135 It is 
here that the commission most clearly abdicated its responsibility to resolve the issue.  
IV. Omar Khadr as a child in the Canadian courts  
At the same time that Omar’s case proceeded in the U.S. legal system, his family retained 
Canadian counsel to represent his interests in the Canadian courts.136 Their options for legal 
action on Omar’s behalf in the Canadian judicial system seemed extremely limited, due to 
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Omar’s custody by the United States, but these lawyers fought courageously on Omar’s behalf 
through a series of challenges to the actions of the Canadian government in its conduct of foreign 
relations, and in visits by Canadian officials to Omar prior to Omar’s access to lawyers or the 
courts in any country. 
As one authority on the Canadian proceedings notes, three successive Canadian Prime 
Ministers refused to grant a request by the Khadr family for his repatriation, despite the fact that 
other U.S. allies had seen the release of their nationals from Guantanamo.137 The primary focus 
of the Canadian federal court litigation, with two appeals to the Canadian Supreme Court, related 
to two issues: first, visits by Canadian officials to Omar Khadr for intelligence purposes and the 
surrender of the fruits of those visits to U.S. officials; and second, the obligation of Canadian 
officials to formally seek repatriation of their national from Guantanamo. The responses by the 
Canadian courts, particularly the lower federal courts, provide, on the one hand, a stark contrast 
to the federal courts of the United States regarding the reception and application of international 
law to resolve domestic issues, although ultimately the Canadian Supreme Court resolved most 
issues exclusively on domestic grounds. On the other hand, these decisions cumulatively had 
virtually no impact on Omar’s liberty or his day-to-day life, simply because of the limits of 
territorial jurisdiction and the fact that Omar was in U.S. custody. 
The Canadian Supreme Court first dealt with the Omar Khadr case in 2008, when it held 
that the fruits of interviews with Omar Khadr, turned over to U.S. officials by Canadian 
intelligence officers during interviews with him at Guantanamo, had to be turned over to his 
Canadian lawyers.138 The lawyers argued that the source for his right to the materials in question 
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lay in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees protection of 
life, liberty and property, and the right not to be deprived of those rights except in accordance 
with “principles of fundamental justice.” Those principles, the Canadian courts had previously 
held, can be found in Canada’s obligations under international human rights law. The justices 
followed a simple analysis accepting that the effect of the decisions by the United States 
Supreme Court in the Rasul and Hamdan cases was that “the conditions under which Mr. Khadr 
was held and was liable for prosecution were illegal under both U.S. and international law at the 
time Canadian officials interviewed Mr. Khadr and gave information to U.S. authorities.”139 If 
Omar’s status as a juvenile was important to the court’s reasoning, it is not apparent from its 
ruling, which mentions only once in passing that Omar was 15 years old at the time of his 
capture.140  But the litigation did not end with that decision; in fact, it was just beginning. 
 The following year, a federal court in Toronto held that Omar had the right, also under 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter, to judicial review of the decision by the government not to 
request his repatriation. The knowing involvement by Canadian officials in Omar’s mistreatment 
in prison (the subject of the prior litigation) was sufficient to overcome the deference normally 
accorded to the executive branch in making repatriation decisions.141 Most significantly, federal 
judge James O’Reilly did two things that no other court, in the U.S. or Canada, had done before. 
First, he relied on numerous international human rights instruments to inform his interpretation 
of section 7’s principles of fundamental justice: the Convention against Torture; the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child; and most importantly, the Protocol on Child Soldiers.142 Second, the 
court relied heavily on Omar’s status as a child in his rationale. That reliance merits a closer 
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look, as it is unique among the decisions reviewed in this article. Moreover, as appeals from 
Judge O’Reilly’s decision progressed, Omar’s status as a minor recedes in importance in the 
reasoning of the courts. 
 Judge O’Reilly based his ruling firmly on a determination that “on detention, Mr. Khadr 
was ‘given no special status as a minor’ even though he was only 15 when he was arrested and 
16 at the time he was transferred to Guantanamo Bay.”143 Immediately after this finding, the 
court notes that Canadian officials had been implicated in the “frequent flier” program of sleep 
deprivation designed to make Omar more willing to provide intelligence. “Mr. Khadr was then a 
17-year-old minor, who was being detained without legal representation, with no access to his 
family and no Canadian consular assistance.”144 Finally, in its reliance on the Optional Protocol, 
the court found that “Canada was obliged to recognize that Mr. Khadr, being a child, was 
vulnerable to being caught up in armed conflict as a result of his personal and social 
circumstances in 2002 and before. It cannot resile from its recognition of the need to protect 
minors, like Mr. Khadr, who are drawn into hostilities before they can apply mature judgment to 
the choices they face.”145 Remarkably, in reaching this conclusion, the court was not only relying 
on the text of the treaties, but interpreting Omar’s narrative with the same understanding that 
flows through the recent jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court on the role of 
cognitive brain development in the exercise of juvenile judgment.146 All of these factors 
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combined to lead the court to conclude that factors relevant to the consideration of the protection 
of Omar Khadr included “his youth; his need for medical attention; his lack of education; access 
to consular assistance and legal counsel; his inability to challenge his detention or conditions of 
confinement in a court of law; and his presence in an unfamiliar, remote and isolated prison, with 
no family contact.”147 These factors resonate not only in principles of human rights law but also 
in the core protections of the law of armed conflict regarding children. The government appealed 
the decision to an intermediate appellate court for further review.  
 In the Ontario Federal Court of Appeals, new and highly relevant facts relating to Omar’s 
status as a minor emerged publically for the first time. In its decision, the three-judge Court of 
Appeals split 2 to 1, upholding the trial court’s decision that the government did not enjoy 
unfettered discretion in its decisions regarding requests for repatriation of Canadian nationals 
from abroad.148 For the first time in public, the court recited a series of diplomatic notes sent by 
the Canadian government to its U.S. counterpart, some of which were sent before Omar’s 
transfer to Guantanamo. Two notes, sent in August and September of 2002 while Omar was still 
held at Bagram, noted that he was a minor, requested that he not be transferred to Guantanamo, 
and “pointed out that the laws of Canada and the United States require special treatment for 
minors with regard to legal and judicial processes.”149 Notes sent in 2003, after Omar’s transfer 
to the base but before he had gained access to counsel, again requested “special consideration” of 
his status as a minor, and noted that he was not being treated like other juvenile detainees (July 9, 
2003); requested assurances that he would not face the death penalty if charged with crimes 
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(October 6, 2003); and requested assurances of medical treatment for injuries (November 12, 
2003).150 No formal responses to any of these inquiries appeared in the appellate record.  
 Aside from the possible relevance that these diplomatic notes might have had in our own 
litigation to seek independent medical treatment for Omar, they are vitally relevant to views of 
the Canadian government officials about juveniles in armed conflict. Without examining the 
legal basis of their assertions, one can draw two immediate inferences from their 
communications. First, Canadian officials, unlike the United States military, viewed Omar as a 
juvenile both at the time of his capture and his later detention to Guantanamo at age 16. Second, 
Canadian officials believed that as a juvenile, Omar was entitled to either entirely avoid 
detention at Guantanamo, or if held there, to conditions that vastly differed from those to which 
he was actually subjected. The transfer of the Afghan children to Camp Iguana and their 
treatment there provide a useful analogy. The Court of Appeals, like the court of first instance, 
invoked the Convention against Torture and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but the 
Optional Protocol is conspicuously absent from its reasoning.151 The reviewing court put more 
weight on mistreatment than juvenile status, providing extended analysis of the definition of 
torture and the link of the principle of fundamental justice to the prohibition on cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, which is characterized as a peremptory or jus cogens norm of customary 
international law.152 In any event, the case would go to the highest court of Canada a second 
time. 
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 On January 29, 2010, in its second round of Khadr litigation, the Canadian Supreme 
Court overturned that aspect of the lower courts’ decisions dealing with repatriation, finding 
itself without the institutional competence to determine such diplomatic issues.153 By this time 
the case had attracted even more international attention, and a total of nine friend-of-court briefs 
were filed, all on Omar Khadr’s behalf.154 The high court, however, retreated to a posture similar 
to that taken in its 2008 decision on the matter, reiterating the constitutional violation of section 
7, with only a whisper of international law. Its operative paragraph held as follows: 
“Interrogation of a youth, to elicit statements about the most serious criminal charges while 
detained in these conditions and without access to counsel, and while knowing that the fruits of 
the interrogation would be shared with the U.S. prosecutors, offends the most basic Canadian 
standards about the treatment of detained youth suspects.”155 Gone are all references to either the 
Torture Convention or Convention on the Rights of the Child and its the Optional Protocol. As 
one scholar notes, “[t]he Court did not acknowledge the international law arguments raised by 
either side” as to the relationship between fundamental justice and international human rights.156 
Gone too is the court’s reliance, but for a small nod, on Omar Khadr’s status as a child as a 
determining factor in the determination of fundamental justice.  
The Canadian lawyers continued the fight, returning to litigate the issue in the lower 
courts. A lower federal court ordered the government to provide a list of potential remedial 
options for violation of Omar’s Charter rights,157 but an appellate court dismissed the matter as 
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moot following Omar’s plea of guilty in military commission proceedings.158 This seems a sad 
denouement to the most far-reaching judicial intervention on behalf of the rights of the child seen 
in this review of litigation on behalf of Omar Khadr.   
V. Omar Khadr as a child in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and other international bodies 
This short section will deal with two dimensions of international advocacy regarding the 
Omar Khadr case. First, it will examine actions taken by students from the International Human 
Rights Law Clinic on behalf of Omar Khadr in the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights.159 It will then briefly summarize the other actions known by the author to have taken 
place in international bodies which explicitly address Omar Khadr’s situation at Guantanamo 
Bay. 
A. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
Students began preparing submissions for the Inter-American Commission during the 
2005-06 school year when it became apparent that the U.S. courts would either ignore or skirt the 
most essential issues relating to his detention as a child. Finding no available forum within the 
United States, students developed a strategy of parallel litigation in the international forum. 
Students prepared two documents: a contentious petition against the United States on behalf of 
Omar Khadr individually, and a request for precautionary measures. Both documents 
exhaustively examined international human rights law with regard to Omar Khadr’s situation. 
The Commission’s Rules of Procedure provide for precautionary measures in “serious 
and urgent situations,” in order “to prevent irreparable harm to persons under the jurisdiction of 
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the State concerned.”160 Precautionary measures are a kind of international injunctive action, and 
can be taken ex parte by the Commission; they may even be requested without the 
contemporaneous filing of a petition, as was the case with the original request for precautionary 
measures for all unnamed detainees in early 2002. Generally, requests for precautionary 
measures can be obtained quite quickly, often within days or weeks of filing. Contentious cases, 
unfortunately, have a much longer time frame, sometimes years before resolution.  
In our case, the matter was rendered simple by the direction of our client. Omar, after 
careful consultation and explanation of the process, agreed to proceed with the request for 
precautionary measures, but explicitly requested that we not file the contentious petition on his 
behalf. We honored that request and filed only the precautionary measures request on January 
17, 2006.161 The request was replete with allegations and legal sources on the protection of 
children in armed conflict. Students appeared at the Commission in early March of 2006 for oral 
presentation of the request to a panel of three commissioners, arguing against a large team of 
lawyers – civilian and military – from the U.S. delegation. Again, aspects of Omar’s status as a 
child stood out in the arguments on his behalf. On March 21, 2006, the Commission granted the 
request, asking the United States to take measures to protect Omar from further mistreatment 
during interrogations and to investigate his claims of torture at the hands of his interrogators.162  
Remarkably, to our utter surprise and disappointment, the letter requesting precautionary 
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measures made no mention of Omar’s age or status as a minor. We could only guess that his 
status did not figure in their calculus of urgency, but it certainly could have been relevant to risk 
of harm. There is no recorded response of the United States to the request. 
B. Action in Other International Bodies 
The United Nations mechanisms for consideration of issues regarding children in armed 
conflict are numerous, and their activity on those issues is continuous. Examples include ongoing 
resolutions of the General Assembly on rights of the child163 and the reports of the Secretary 
General on children in armed conflict.164 Only rarely does the UN, its treaty bodies or related 
agencies go on record with regard to specific cases. It has done so through at least three organs 
with regard to the Omar Khadr case: UNICEF, the UN children’s agency; the general reporting 
process of the Committee on the Rights of the Child; and the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflict. 
As early as May 2008, UNICEF, the United Nations Children’s Fund, expressed 
“concern about the fate of Omar Khadr.” In a brief press announcement, the child protection 
spokesman at UNICEF, Geoffrey Keele, “insists that Omar Khadr should be treated as a victim 
of adults rather than as a criminal.” His trial would, said Keele, “set a dangerous precedent for 
other children affected by conflict.”165 Two years later, when the Khadr trial seemed imminent, 
UNICEF spoke up again. Anthony Lake, a former national security advisor to President Clinton 
and now head of UNICEF, again spoke of the dangerous precedent of the case, called for 
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prosecution of only the recruiters of children, and noted that the children “are victims, acting 
under coercion.”166 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child receives periodic reports from states parties to 
either the Convention on the Rights of the Child or its protocols. The United States submitted its 
first report in June of 2007.167 In conjunction with the submission of the report, which made no 
direct mention of either Guantanamo or Omar Khadr, the Committee submitted a list of written 
questions for response. The written responses of the United States government to specific 
questions about Guantanamo and the children there noted and discussed the case of Omar Khadr 
in several paragraphs, all of which justified their actions as legal.168  
The Committee, as is customary, issued its concluding observations on the report of the 
United States in June of 2008.169 Again, although it did not explicitly mention Omar Khadr’s 
case, the observations were pointed. They expressed “concern” that children were being tried at 
Guantanamo for war crimes “rather than being considered primarily as victims,” and “without 
due account of their status as children.” The Committee recommended, inter alia, that “detention 
of children at Guantanamo Bay should be prevented,” and that children there be provided with 
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“physical and psychological recovery measures, including educational programmes and sports 
and leisure activities, as well as measures for all detained children’s social reintegration.”170 
 Radhika Coomaraswamy serves as the UN Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on Children in Armed Conflict. During 2009 and 2010, she boldly spoke out on at least 
five occasions about the pending charges and ultimate disposition of the Khadr case in military 
commission proceedings. Even before her official statements, there was a request by Omar’s 
military lawyers to permit a representative of her office to attend the Khadr military commission 
proceedings as an observer. The request was denied.171  
Her first public comments were in August of 2009, when Ms. Coomaraswamy welcomed 
the release of another child in commission proceedings, Mohammed Jawad. The statement, 
headed as “All Juvenile Detainees Must be Released from Guantanamo,” quoted her as saying 
that the trial of a minor “would have created a dangerous international precedent," if Jawad’s 
case had gone to trial. She expressed the hope for the release of Omar Khadr “soon.”172 In 
October of 2009, the Special Representative ramped up her criticism. In an extended statement to 
the Third Committee of the UN, she again welcomed the release of Mohammed Jawad from 
Guantanamo. What she then said about the Khadr case merits extended quotation: 
[W]e look forward to similar action being taken with regard to Omar Khadr. 
Children should be made aware of the gravity of their acts but not in the context 
of a war crime prosecution. Children may be required to undergo procedures 
related to truth and reconciliation commissions or other restorative justice 
measures that are relevant to their societies, so that they understand that certain 
types of behaviour will not be tolerated. But we must not forget that they are 
                                                 
170
 Id. at ¶¶ 29-30. 
171
 Michelle Shephard, UN Observer Can’t Attend Omar Khadr Hearing, Pentagon Says, Toronto Star, January 24, 
2008.  
172
 United Nations, Special Representative of the Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflict, Statement: All 
Juvenile Detainees Must be Released from Guantanamo, 25 August 2009.  
Draft of January 9, 2012 
55 
 
primarily victims of adult cunning and cruelty, and therefore should be 
rehabilitated and assisted to find a constructive role in society.173 
 In May and October of 2010, as proceedings in the military commission intensified, Ms. 
Coomaraswamy again spoke out against trial. In the May statement, she called on Canada and 
the United States to respect the spirit of the Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers, and to release 
Omar Khadr without trial. “Like other children abused by armed groups around the world who 
are repatriated to their home communities and undergo re-education for their reintegration,” she 
stated, “Omar should be given the same protections afforded these children.”174 In October of 
2010, on the occasion of what was planned to be the start of his trial, she again spoke out 
strongly: “The Omar Khadr case will set a precedent that may endanger the status of child 
soldiers all over the world.”175 Despite her escalating words, however, Omar’s case proceeded to 
its conclusion. Her final action was a letter from her office to “members of the military 
commission,” dated 27 October 2010, after his plea of guilty but before his final sentencing. The 
letter was her most direct and most passionate. She reiterated the obligation of parties of the 
Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers to “support . . . reintegra[tion] into their families and 
communities and that states parties should provide any necessary assistance to these children 
wherever they are found.” She radically shifted the Omar Khadr narrative by arguing that the 
facts show that “[i]n every sense Omar represents the classic child soldier narrative; recruited by 
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unscrupulous groups to undertake actions at the bidding of adults to fight battles they barely 
understand.”176 
VI. Conclusion: The outcome of the Khadr case and the intersections of 
humanitarian and human rights law for a child charged with war crimes 
  At age 24, after spending more than a third of his young life in U.S. detention, and nearly 
five years after he was initially charged with any crime, Omar Khadr pled guilty to multiple war 
crimes before a military commission at Guantanamo Bay on October 13, 2010. Though captured 
at age 15, at no time did the U.S. government, in or out of court, ever acknowledge him as a 
juvenile, as a minor, or as a child. No U.S. court overtly recognized his childhood as a 
jurisdictional, procedural or mitigating factor in their decision-making. Neither courts nor other 
institutions treated him as a child under international or U.S. law, both of which call for 
rehabilitation as the primary mission of juvenile justice. Omar Khadr was treated as an adult for 
all purposes. This final section will first examine the outcome of his case and the accompanying 
narrative of Omar Khadr himself then explore some of the interaction of international human 
rights and humanitarian law in his case in broader perspective. 
A. The Outcome: Omar Khadr Pleads Guilty and Hopes to Return to Canada 
The charges to which Omar Khadr pleaded guilty included the crimes of murder and 
attempted murder “in violation of the laws of war,” conspiracy, material support for terrorism, 
and spying. In the narrowest sense, both factually and legally, the stipulation of facts 
accompanying Omar Khadr’s guilty plea contains all of the relevant “truth” about why Khadr’s 
detention is justified. He admitted to the veracity of those facts in open court. The stipulation 
bears extended quotation here, as it is relevant to the ensuing discussion on his accountability for 
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those events, whether as a soldier or as a child. What follows is only that portion of the 
stipulation that gave rise to the charge of “murder in violation of the laws of war,” for the death 
of Sgt. Christopher Speer, part of the U.S. military force involved in the incident in question: 
On 27 July 2002, Khadr was at a compound in Ayub Kheil with the al Qaeda explosives cell. U.S. 
forces received information that suspected members of al Qaeda were operating out of the 
compound and were conducting attacks against U.S. and coalition forces. Prior to the Americans 
arriving, Khadr and the other cell members received word that the Americans were coming to their 
location. While the owner of the compound, Aman Ullah, fled, Khadr stayed behind in order to 
fight the Americans. U.S. forces then moved to the compound and asked the occupants, including 
Khadr, to come outside of the compound to talk to the U.S. forces. At that time, Khadr knew that 
the forces outside the compound were American. The request to the al Qaeda members was 
relayed in both English and Pashto (the primary language in Afghanistan). Khadr is and was at 
that time fluent in both English and Pashto.  
When Khadr and the other al Qaeda cell members refused to come outside of the compound or to 
speak to the U.S. forces, two members of the accompanying Afghan Military Forces entered the 
main compound, raised their heads above a wall and again asked for the occupants of the 
compound to come out and speak to the U.S. led forces. At that moment, individuals in the house 
opened fire, instantly killing both Afghan soldiers. U.S. soldiers pulled the Afghan soldiers out of 
the compound and a four-hour firefight between U.S. soldiers and the al Qaeda cell commenced.  
*** 
Close air support was called in by the US forces. A-10s [ground-attack fighter jets] and Apache 
attack helicopters dropped bombs (including two 500 pound bombs) and fired thousands of rounds 
of ammunition into the compound. During the bombing, Khadr was injured in the eyes and leg by 
shrapnel from a U.S. grenade.  
*** 
After the U.S. forces believed the fIrefight was over, they began clearing the compound. A U.S. 
Special Forces unit entered the compound. It was the belief of the U.S. forces that all individuals 
inside the compound had been killed during the battle. After entering the compound the unit began 
taking direct fire from an AK·47. One soldier saw the individual firing the AK· 47, engaged and 
killed him. 
  
Upon hearing the U.S. Special Forces soldiers, Khadr, positioned behind a crumbling wall, armed 
and threw a Russian F-l grenade in the vicinity of the talking soldiers. Khadr threw the grenade 
with the specific intent of killing or injuring as many Americans as he could. The grenade thrown 
by Khadr exploded near Sergeant First Class ("SFC") Christopher Speer, launching shrapnel into 
his head and causing mortal brain damage. SFC Speer was killed by the grenade that Khadr threw. 
He died approximately 12 days later on 8 August 2002.177  
 
 In fact, this snippet of the stipulation of fact is but a small part of an extended narrative 
which includes information about Omar’s family, his activities in Afghanistan before his capture, 
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and a general profile of Al Qaeda terrorist ends and activities (one that was included, in one 
version or another, in the “evidence” supporting charges against all of those appearing in military 
commission proceedings, and without any discernible nexus to the actions of the accused).178 
Notably, the stipulation contains no information about the nature or conditions of Omar’s 
detention or his treatment during interrogation. Although Omar’s age at the time of his capture is 
mentioned, it appears to have had no mitigating impact, at least on the record.   
The death of Sgt. Speer, and Omar Khadr’s responsibility for it, was the heart of the 
prosecution against him. Yet many observers raised serious questions about whether Omar did 
throw the grenade that killed Speer. Though he allegedly confessed to the killing, he argued and 
lost on the question of whether his statements were coerced or involuntary, the product of harsh, 
repeated and continuous interrogations. There was also the troubling statement by a U.S. 
commando at the compound in Afghanistan, mistakenly provided to reporters during a pre-trial 
commission hearing in February 2008. The report by the soldier, known as OC-1, describes the 
moments after the grenade was thrown: 
He heard moaning coming from the back of the compound. The dust rose up from the ground and 
began to clear, he then saw a man facing him lying on his right side . . . The man had an AK-47 on 
the ground beside him and the man was moving. OC-1 fired one round striking the man in the 
head and the movement ceased. Dust was again stirred by this rifle shot. When the dust rose, he 
saw a second man sitting facing away from him leaning against the brush. This man, later 
identified as Khadr, was moving . . . OC-1 fired two rounds both of which struck Khadr in the 
back. OC-1 estimated that from the initiation of the approach to the compound to shooting Khadr 
took no more than 90 seconds, with all of the events inside the compound happening in less than a 
minute.179 
 The military’s own document thus confirms that Omar Khadr was sitting down on the 
ground, facing away from the entrance, and was shot twice immediately after the troops entered, 
casting doubt on his ability to lob a grenade beyond the compound’s walls at that moment or just 
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before. The doubt injected into the commission proceedings by this document was shared by 
many. One NGO observer opined: “Although the government did not appear to have any 
forensic or eyewitness testimony to support its murder charge, government interrogators planned 
to testify that Khadr had willingly told them that he threw the grenade that killed Sergeant First 
Class Christopher Speer. Whether he said that because it was true, or because he was a scared 
and wounded 15-year-old expecting a quick release for telling his interrogators what they wanted 
to hear, we'll never know.”180 Another observer, Andrea Prasow, had worked as a civilian in the 
commission’s military defense office before going to work for Human Rights Watch. She had 
visited with Omar Khadr at Guantanamo. Her conclusions on the sentencing hearing bear 
extended quotation: 
The plea agreement leaves many questions unanswered. Indeed, we will never even know 
for sure if Khadr was responsible for killing a US soldier. Prior to the trial, there were 
compelling indications that another al Qaeda militant actually threw the grenade that 
killed Sergeant Speer. Even if scientific developments would make greater certainty 
possible in the future, Khadr's plea agreement includes a promise never to pursue forensic 
testing of the evidence, and allows the US government to destroy all the evidence 
following sentencing. Khadr has also waived all appeals and promised not to pursue 
litigation against the US government in any forum for any matter relating to his detention 
and trial. No jury will ever hear Khadr's allegations of abuse or the admissions of abuse 
by a US interrogator.181  
 There were, of course, other serious charges, and Omar Khadr pled guilty to every 
charge. What appears clear, however, was that a U.S. soldier had died at the hands of terrorists, 
and Omar Khadr was the only person who survived that day, so he would pay the price.  
In return for Omar Khadr’s plea of guilty, the Convening Authority for military 
commissions agreed not to approve a sentence of confinement of greater than eight years, with 
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no credit for time served (as required under the military commissions statute), and further that 
after at least one more year at Guantanamo, he was eligible to be transferred to Canada to serve 
out the remainder of his sentence under Canadian law.182 This complex plea agreement, however, 
did not settle the matter of sentencing. In what might be described as bizarre kabuki theater, 
performed exclusively for the press, a full sentencing hearing in the Khadr case was held before 
a sentencing jury in Guantanamo just after he entered his plea of guilty. It was agreed that if the 
jury returned a verdict greater than the eight years for which Omar had bargained, he would 
serve only the eight years agreed to previously. If the verdict was lower, he would receive the 
more lenient sentence.  
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution was permitted to put on testimony from Sgt. 
Layne Morris, a soldier injured during Omar’s capture, and Tabitha Speer, the widow of 
Christopher Speer, the U.S. soldier who died in the compound.183 A controversial “expert,” 
Michael Welner, also testified for the prosecution, calling Omar an “al-Qaeda rock star.” 
Another expert, Navy Capt. Patrick McCarthy, described Omar as a “model prisoner, respectful 
and helpful to military personnel,”184 the military sentencing panel passed a sentence of 40 years 
imprisonment on October 31, 2010. That sentence became the public narrative of the Defense 
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Department, touting the efficacy of military commissions.185 It was, however, legally irrelevant, 
as the plea deal meant that Omar would serve only the 8 years to which all parties agreed.  
There is yet another sad post-script to the Omar Khadr saga. At the time of this writing, 
in late December 2011, there is no realistic prospect that Omar will be transferred back to 
Canada anytime in the near future. This is true despite what most of the press took to be part of 
the plea agreement that after one additional year at Guantanamo, or about the end of October 
2011, Omar would be transferred to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence in Canada, 
with the domestic law of Canada controlling the issues of his release from prison.186 Canadian 
news media note that a request for transfer has been lodged by the Canadian attorneys, but that 
Canadian officials have said that even without objections, “a decision could take up to 18 
months.”187  
U.S. officials note that they cannot act until they receive a formal request, and that new 
U.S. law requires, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, that the Secretary 
of Defense certify to Congress that “Canada is a fit place to send a convicted terrorist, a nation 
not likely to permit him to attack the United States, and one that has control over its prisons.”188 
The pre-trial agreement signed before Omar’s guilty plea explicitly states that non-acceptance by 
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the Canadian government of an application for transfer “will have no impact on this 
agreement.”189 In other words, Omar could serve his entire remaining sentence in Cuba.   
Omar Khadr made a formal statement at sentencing hearing. This was one of the few 
times he had spoken publicly since his detention – he had never testified in open court, and the 
others had been brief statements during his commission proceedings. His voice was otherwise 
silenced. He noted that his education stopped at eighth grade, that his hobbies were sports and 
reading. His biggest dream was to get out of Guantanamo, then to become a doctor. Invoking 
Nelson Mandela, he had concluded that “you’re not going to gain anything with hate . . . love 
and forgiveness are more constructive and will bring people together.” He stood and spoke 
directly to Tabitha Speer: “I’m really sorry for the pain I’ve caused you and your family. I wish I 
could do something that would take this pain away from you. This is all I can say.”190 
What then is the “true” story of Omar Khadr, the child-man of Guantanamo? In a 
forthcoming book on “reimagining” child soldiers, Prof. Mark Drumbl suggests that what he 
calls the “international legal imagination,” essentializes the child soldier into one of four images: 
the “guileless naïf,” “irreparable damaged goods,” the “hero,” or the “demon and bandit.” The 
first category, what alternatively might be called the “faultless passive victim,” carries great 
weight in the hierarchy of these images in that imagination.191 His overall point is that this is too 
narrow a vision of the child soldier, one that dehumanizes the real children. The legal 
imagination, he argues, must construct a more nuanced view of the child in armed conflict.192  
                                                 
189
 Offer of Pre-Trial Agreement, supra n. 187, at 5, section 5(h). 
190
 Omar Khadr Apologizes to Widow, CBC News, October 29, 2010 (providing the full text of the statement), at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/omar-khadr-sentencing-hearing.html, visited on December 26, 2011.   
191
 Drumbl, supra n. 4, at 12-15. 
192
 Id. at 15-16. 
Draft of January 9, 2012 
63 
 
Without question, it was the mission of the United States government, largely through the 
Pentagon and the White House, to characterize all of the publicly known children at Guantanamo 
as demons and bandits, what Drumbl details as “irredeemable, baleful, and sinister. Pursuant to 
this depiction, the child soldier is a ticking time bomb, bad seed, and warped soul incorrigibly.” 
Such was clearly the intent of General Myers and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in the excerpt 
included as one of three headnotes to this article. Once cast in this mold, investment in 
rehabilitation of the demon seems pointless.193 
My own view is informed by sitting with Omar for hours at a time over many, many 
sessions. Sometimes these sessions were intense and emotional, and sometimes they were 
boring, but we discussed virtually all aspects of his young life, at least those he was willing to 
disclose. By the time we met him, of course, he was already 18 years old, but he was still a boy. 
He was small and had almost no facial hair. He fit none of the four images proposed by Drumbl; 
not even close. Omar was certainly neither demon nor bandit. He was, in my view, a highly 
adaptable and social survivor, someone who could use his easy and genuine smile, as well as his 
multiple linguistic skills (English, Arabic, Pashtu and Urdu) to provide easy access to almost any 
community. He had a kind of innate sensitivity to the emotions of others that he used as a 
barometer for his own reactions to them. He read a good deal; Harry Potter was a favorite. I 
never felt that he kept the truth from us over time, at least as he experienced it. To me, he was an 
honest, sincere and eminently likable kid.      
B. A Few Reflections on the Operation of International Law in the Khadr Case 
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When and how did international human rights and humanitarian law interact in judicial 
decisions of the U.S. courts involving Omar Khadr? The answer is simple: almost never. When 
one adds the decisions of Canadian courts and international bodies, the answer becomes a bit 
more complex, but not exponentially so. The simple fact is that there was precious little 
interaction of legal doctrines on children in armed conflict in any dispositive decision in Omar 
Khadr’s case. This is certainly true in the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court, and in 
the precautionary measures decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 
Before examining those precious few instances where interaction did occur, it might be useful to 
reflect on why international law on children, whether in armed conflict or not, was so scarce in 
operative court decisions. There are obvious as well as more subtle answers to why the courts 
avoided the international law issues relating to children. 
The most obvious reason the courts ignored international law relating to children has to 
do with my repeated invocation of context. The voice of the government in responding to the 
attacks of 9/11 was, not to coin a phrase, extremely loud and incredibly close. If possible, that 
voice was even further amplified by the Pentagon’s hired “message force multipliers,” (as only 
the military could so designate), individuals provided by the armed services with talking points 
to present when they appeared as supposedly neutral military analysts on television or in other 
media.194 The drumbeat for vengeance was strong and constant, and the Khadr family, with 
identified ties to al Qaeda, was an easy target. Omar’s own young, inexperienced and isolated 
voice was a tiny whisper by comparison, nearly gagged by government restrictions on 
communication with the outside world. Above all, an American soldier had died, and Omar was 
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believed to be responsible. Notably, even the most sympathetic scholars writing on the Omar 
Khadr case often accept the narrative of Omar as trained and hardened terrorist operative.  
A second obvious reason for non-distinction as a child was that Omar Khadr was part of 
the huge Guantanamo “collective,” a group of 779 people with extremely complex legal issues, 
issues that three trips to the United States Supreme Court have left far from settled. From the 
very start, those larger issues pulled attention away from more isolated issues such as juvenile 
status. This was nowhere more apparent than in the decision of Judge Green in the U.S. District 
Court, dealing with the most crucial common issues of the eleven detainees before her and 
summarily dismissing all others, including the application of any of the treaties dealing with 
children in armed conflict, and virtually the entire body of customary international law. Her 
decision on that matter technically precluded consideration of the issue by the U.S. federal courts 
for years. A third and related issue is the general antipathy by the U.S. courts to reaching any 
issue of moment through the invocation of international human rights or humanitarian law as the 
doctrinal fulcrum. U.S. courts have shown their discomfort, usually through inexperience, with 
these bodies of law, as well as their distinctive inclination towards domestic law for resolution of 
complex or underdeveloped areas. The Bush and Obama administrations have both shrewdly 
played to that discomfort by further blurring definitions to justify strong executive discretion in 
terrorism cases. 
One final factor deserves mention, one so obvious as to sometimes slip by unnoticed. 
That is the simple passage of time. By the time he arrived at Guantanamo, Omar was 16. By the 
time he saw anyone other than interrogators or guards, Omar was a legal adult of 18. By the time 
criminal charges were brought, he was 19, well over six feet tall with full, dark facial hair. He 
looked adult. And by the time pre-trial skirmishing began in earnest, he was well into his second 
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decade of life. It was, in my view, crucial to the analysis of Omar’s situation by Judge Bates, in 
both of the initial habeas challenges by Omar, that he purportedly sought prospective protection 
only, and that the protections accorded to adults were not the same as those for children. 
Although, logically, the law to be applied is that of the time of the original alleged offenses, 
when Omar was a young 15, it was hard to see him for anything other than the strapping adult he 
appeared to be in the courtroom. Although the unreasonable passage of time from offense to 
trial, totally apart from domestic speedy trial concepts, is a relevant factor in international human 
rights law, 195 that issue is not unique to juveniles, and for all the reasons stated above, would 
likely have been as unavailing as the others. 
There were a few occasions when the courts and UN bodies did look at how the question 
of Omar’s childhood should be understood through international law. Curiously, when given the 
clearest opportunity to do that, based on pleadings and friend-of-court submissions, neither the 
federal district court nor the military commission reached the issue at all, with both Judge Bates 
and the presiding officer deferring based on purely domestic legal interpretations. Judge James 
O’Reilly, in Canada, applied international norms in his federal court ruling of April 2009 relating 
to judicial review of an executive branch decision not to repatriate. Judge O’Reilly read 
“fundamental justice” notions in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter through human rights law, 
with some reliance on humanitarian law. He relied on the Convention Against Torture for its 
definition of torture and for its provisions relating to the duty not to use evidence obtained by 
torture in judicial proceedings.196 As to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, he again 
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largely relied on portions of that treaty dealing with human rights, with no additional sources.197 
The Protocol on Child Soldiers also figured in his decision, although only marginally. He found 
it had no direct application to Canada in Omar Khadr’s circumstances, but that it is based on 
“broader principles” set out in the preamble which recognize the special needs of children 
vulnerable to recruitment of child victims of armed conflict, and to provide for rehabilitation and 
reintegration.198 As such, the Optional Protocol was invoked more for its human rights 
dimensions than any other reason. In the Court of Appeals’ review of the O’Reilly decision, as 
noted above, review on international law grounds was narrower than the federal court. The 
Ontario Court of Appeals invoked the Torture Convention and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child in their interpretation of Section 7 obligations of fundamental justice, but the latter 
treaty only with regard to its protections of children against torture and other cruel treatment.199 
Thus, the appellate court was more narrowly relying on general human rights norms, and not 
explicitly on Omar’s status as a child as a source for relief. 
The UN bodies present an interesting contrast. These bodies have a certain uniformity to 
their approach. All use the language of Omar Khadr as “victim” rather than soldier. UNICEF and 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child made general references, respectively, to the need for 
“special protection” of children, and to the need to give “due account to [Guantanamo 
detainees’] status as children.” Both of these invoke general human rights obligations to children. 
Not surprisingly, however, the Special Representative on Children in Armed Conflict and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, reviewing U.S. compliance with the Optional Protocol on 
Child Soldiers, focused on state obligations to rehabilitate and reintegration, both notions that 
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arise in the context of humanitarian law. Both UNICEF and the Special Representative pointed 
to the risky or dangerous precedent set by the U.S. decision to prosecute a child for war crimes, 
also a concept related to humanitarian law, with implicit human rights guarantees of due process 
and fair trial. None of the UN bodies to speak to the issue stepped beyond the narrow confines of 
their mandates, or a narrow reading of international instruments, to apply or suggest the use of 
additional norms from either human rights or humanitarian law.200 
In the final analysis, the tribunals that could have held the United States to account for its 
non-compliance with international law utterly failed to do so. As such, they abdicated a 
responsibility not only to Omar Khadr but to us all.    
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 Other scholars have noticed this timidity on the part of the Committee on the Rights of the Child. David 
Weissbrodt, Joseph C. Hanson and Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, The Role of the Committee on the Rights of the Child in 
Interpreting and Developing Humanitarian Law, 24 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 115, 153 (2011) (noting, after extensive 
analysis of the committee’s work, that it “must consider international humanitarian law as incorporated through 
Article 38” of the Children’s Convention.)  
